ABSTRACT As populations age, there is a growing need for the establishment and staffing of care centers, but the supply of such facilities is not keeping pace with demand. Existing hospitals, care centers, and other institutions currently provide care for many physically disabled and elderly patients. For these patients to go outside in the fresh air, they must necessarily leave their designated care areas, but this poses a risk of falls and other accidents, which can be particularly challenging to prevent or respond to the given staffing limitations. Such incidents can cause further physical and mental deterioration. Many studies have sought to minimize rescue response times by first establishing the incident location before alerting staff to respond. However, this approach does not guarantee minimized response times. This paper proposes an approach to allow medical staff to quickly arrive at the scene of an accident with patients and staff using mobile devices to automatically alert a central server of their current locations. In response to an accident notification, the server immediately alerts medical staff in closest proximity to the incident to respond, with the staff devices providing clear directions to reach the patient in distress, thus minimizing response times. The proposed system can operate while maintaining security and patient information privacy, including the data integrity, anonymity, authentication, location confidentiality, location unforgeability, and resistance to asynchronous and tracking attacks, and is implemented on Android smart phones. The proposed system can be used in homes, hospitals, care centers, or any other venue offering long-term care. This proposal is the first such real-time and automated emergency rescue alert system to provide both information privacy and authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hospitals care for many patients and elderly people who, due to mobility issues, are at risk of falls, and may require quick response in the event of an accident, thus raising the need for medical staff to immediately and accurately locate accident victims. Positioning technology offers significant advantages to this end.
Long-Term Care: Today, many countries seek to establish long-term care systems to provide quality, affordable and universal care for the elderly, allowing them to enjoy their old age in a familiar environment, while reducing the burden of such care on the family. The desired concentration of such long-term care centers entails a significant staffing challenge, and potential staff must be willing to undergo extensive professional training, thus many such facilities may be understaffed. Elderly and disabled patients are free to roam the premises in such centers, but are prone to falls and accidents from which they may be unable to recover without assistance. In understaffed facilities, such accidents may not be immediately noticed, thus delaying treatment, potentially with severe consequences.
Traditional Emergency System: To address this issue, hospitals have established panic button systems to summon medical staff. However, not all areas of a facility to which patients have access necessarily have panic buttons and, even when a panic button is nearby, someone other than the accident victim must be available to press it or help the victim.
Class of Emergency System: Bastos et al. [1] reviewed the literature on the use of indoor positioning technologies for emergency response since 2004. Aside from comparing technology use and practices, they also classified each approach according to response requirements. Glanzer [2] suggested that, in general, personal and emergency response use require different levels of location precision, and reviewed most existing positioning technologies, categorizing them as for personal or emergency response use. In general, emergency response systems can be divided into two different types. In the first type, the response target waits passively for rescue while in the second s/he actively seeks assistance. Additional systems are designed for use by rescuers.
Emergency Rescue System for Passive Targets: This type of system focuses on the rescue of passive targets, in which the victims typically stay in one place and continuously transmit their positioning information. For example, in responding to a fire, firefighters or EMTs (Emergency Medical Technicians) can use a building's positioning system to assess victim location, and thus head directly to the appropriate floor, ensuring efficient rescue operations, where EMTs may refer ambulance men, emergency responders, or emergencyservice personnel. In 2015, Berbakov et al. [3] proposed using built-in smart phone sensors to achieve positioning through dead reckoning. The resulting information could then be uploaded to a database for emergency use. In 2016, Srinivasan et al. [4] proposed a new rescue system incorporating three roles: Smart Building, Community Cloud, and Emergency Service Provider. A Smart Building will regularly upload its occupant distribution and status information to the Community Cloud for access by Emergency Service Providers in the event of an emergency. In 2013, Do et al. [5] proposed using RFID to establish positioning for rescue facilitation and to guide civilians to safety in the event of an emergency. In 2014, Li et al. [6] proposed a method of positioning rescuers and accident victims with room-byroom precision, thus facilitating deployment of equipment and staff. Nie et al. [7] proposed using Zigbee to implement interior positioning, and used physiological indicators to monitor the health status of miners, providing critical data to surface workers responding to an underground emergency.
Emergency Rescue System for Active Targets: Active targets track their own positions and send their location information to rescuers in the event of an accident. For example, lost or injured hikers will locate themselves by GPS and then attempt to transmit this information to the outside world. In 2014, Kau and Chen [8] proposed using smartphone sensors to detect user falls. Once a fall is detected, the device uses GPS to determine the user's location, and Wi-Fi or wireless networks to call medical staff to respond. In 2004, Liutkauskas et al. [9] proposed an Emergency Call Service for use in a range of environments with various positioning precision requirements and reliability to meet rescue needs, and also compared existing positioning technologies in terms of suitability for use by rescue services.
Emergency Rescue System: This type of system is used exclusively by first responders. In 2011, Amanantiadis et al. [10] proposed a system which integrated sensors, digital imaging and RFID to determine positioning according to status weightings in a fuzzy inference system, thus offering rescuers a robust and highly sophisticated navigation system. In 2013, Hari et al. [11] proposed a system incorporating inertial sensors embedded in the rescuer's shoes, along with helmet-mounted cameras to help rescuer's quickly locate and navigate through disaster sites. In 2012, Moon et al. [12] proposed using AP and Wi-Fi to provide firefighters with accurate positioning data to enhance on-site safety. In 2013, the same team proposed a new method which applied SLAM, EKF and other methods to the distance between two firefighters within earshot to calculate their relative positioning, thus allowing one firefighter to use the other as a positioning landmark [13] . In 2012 Pascucci et al. [14] proposed a low-cost, easy-to-implement and high precision positioning system for rescue personnel. In 2011, Rantatkokko et al. [15] proposed a sensor system for use in military rescue missions. In 2013, Zhang et al. [16] proposed an indoor positioning method using inertial sensors which could be used by emergency responders. In 2011, Pascucci and Setola [17] proposed using RFID positioning technology to assist evacuation, and this approach can also be used by rescue personnel and robots. In 2013, Zhang et al. [18] noted that existing systems were mostly unsuitable for use in emergency situations, and proposed adopting UWB technologies to assist first responders in emergencies. In 2012, Guiliano et al. [19] proposed a set of positioning tools to conduct a range of tests to confirm RFID reliability and accuracy to meet the needs of emergency responders. In 2012, Zhou et al. [20] proposed a longwave positioning method which, compared to Zigbee, Wi-Fi and other short-wave methods, offered improved penetration and farther reach. Data transfer can then be accomplished through 3G, Wi-Fi or other short-wave communications.
Secure Emergency System: All of the above-mentioned rescue systems entail the use of personal location information, which may be inadvertently leaked to third parties or attackers, thus compromising user privacy. In 2016, Ghafghazi et al. [21] proposed an attribute-based encryption and broadcast encryption, using encrypted texts of consistent size to provide constant pairs for decryption. In 2016, Zhu et al. [22] proposed an encrypted text method using a special spatial range query algorithm which can ensure user location information security at the server end. In 2016, Yu et al. [23] proposed a privacy-preserving based scheduling scheme for emergency response which can protect location and other sensitive data.
Wireless body area network: A wireless body area network (WBAN), which is proposed by Zimmerman [27] , is a wireless network of wearable computing devices and uses wireless personal area network (WPAN) technology [28] to collects real-time biomedical data through many low power intelligent sensors, placed in or around the human body, and sends the data to a remote medical server through mobile devices, providing a remote and real-time monitoring [29] [30] [31] . The standard IEEE 802.15.6 describes security requirements and various security levels in WBANs, and recommends four elliptic curve-based security schemes. However, Toorani indicates those schemes lacks forward secrecy, and is vulnerable to an impersonation attack, a KCI attack, and an invalid-curve attack [32] , [33] . To enhance security for WBANs, anonymous authentication (AA) schemes [29] have been studied to provide authentication, privacy preservation, confidentiality, integrity, and nonrepudiation based on a shared key. However, He et al. [29] point out that AA scheme is not secure for medical applications by an impersonation attack.
Paper Contribution: This article focuses on active rescue approaches for use in hospitals and rest homes caring for disabled patients and residents. Accidents in such environments may occur in isolation, with no one at hand to report or assist. In such instances, the proposed system uses smart phones to ensure that the nearest available medical personnel are alerted and guided to the victim to minimize response times. In addition, user and staff location information is protected, and the system provides security features such as anonymity and information integrity.
Paper Structure: This paper is divided into six sections. Section two reviews the relevant literature to explain and analyze the referenced schemes. Section three describes the proposed emergency system's contents and structures. Section four analyze the proposed of six emergency requirements and seven security requirements. Section five describes an actual implementation using Android phone and section six draws a conclusion.
II. RELATED WORKS
This section introduce Srinivasan et al. [4] scheme because, compared to other schemes, only the function of their scheme is partially similar to ours.
Fires, earthquakes and other disasters are typically complicated by lack of preparedness. While local communities and government agencies may regularly conduct disaster prevention exercises, judgment can fail quickly in the event of an actual emergency. This can cause rescuers to fail to take the most secure route, leading to further accidents and casualties.
In 2016, Srinivasan et al. [4] proposed a system for emergency response within buildings. The system architecture included three roles: Smart Building, Community Cloud and Emergency Service Provider, and covered all interactions between these roles during normal operations and during emergencies. They also proposed means of handling sensitive information within the system.
To enhance rescue effectiveness, medical and disaster relief personnel can use their system to first familiarize themselves with the building's structure and determine the location of rescue targets before entering. In addition, the system provides rescuers with rescue target medical history and mobility status, thus facilitating rescue planning and likelihood of successful rescue. This section reviews and discusses the scheme of Srinivasan et al. [4] .
A. REVIEW OF SRINIVASAN et al.'S SCHEME As shown in Fig. 1 , Srinivasan et al. [4] system has three roles: Smart Building, Community Cloud and Emergency Service Provider. These three roles respectively collect data, store data and act on the data to perform rescue work. The operations for each role in emergency and non-emergency conditions are described as follows: 
1) SMART BUILDING
A Smart Building is a structure equipped with multiple sensors. Our proposed method uses sensors to locate and track users, using technologies including RFID matrixes, Wi-Fi AP, Bluetooth Beacon, hand-held radars, etc. RFID matrixes can detect the movement of individuals in indoor environments, while hand-held radars can not only track human movement but can also detect the heart rate of individuals. People carrying mobile devices can be tracked through indoor positioning systems, which can also provide access to their corresponding medical history and records, thus allowing medical staff to better coordinate with rescuers.
Servers within the Smart Building can collect useful data from these sensors, including living conditions, occupancy distributions, and location and current trajectory of occupants. Through local area networks (LAN), this data can be uploaded to the Community Cloud, ensuring detailed data for the entire building is available to rescue workers in the event of an emergency.
2) COMMUNITY CLOUD
A Community Cloud is a cloud-based database which continually collects sensor data from a Smart Building, making VOLUME 6, 2018 this data easily available in the event of an emergency. Access restrictions are applied to provide different information granularity for scenarios.
In non-emergency situations, the Community Cloud provides rough resolution data to the Emergency Service Provider for use in monitoring building activities. However, in the event of an emergency, the Community Cloud can release detailed information to authorized medical staff, allowing for more efficient rescue operations.
3) EMERGENCY SERVICE PROVIDER
The Emergency Service Provider is a group which provides rescue services, including staff trained to provide medical services such as firefighters and other caregivers. In response to an alert, such as a building alarm being manually or automatically triggered in response to an emergency, the Emergency Service Provider immediately dispatches specialized medical staff to provide relief. These rescuers can then access real-time building information from the Community Cloud, to facilitate their rescue efforts.
B. PRIVACY CONCERNS
The information collected within a Smart Building is highly sensitive because the location of individuals within the structure can be actively and continuously tracked. The location and movement information of these individuals are stored in the Community Cloud, and can be released to the Emergency Service Provider and its medical staff members. Therefore, the transmission of this sensitive information poses a security risk. Location information is typically only stored for a minute or less, but leakage of these records to unauthorized users could pose a serious security risk to the building and its occupants.
In non-emergency situations, the Emergency Service Provider actively monitors the building status, for which it requires access to less-detailed data, thus the Community Cloud only provides low-granularity information that does not contain personal details, thus maintaining privacy. Also, such conditions do not require such a high degree of information density, and thus the Emergency Service Provider is only able to access building data once every 30 minutes to reduce the risk of building data from being behavior pattern analyzed.
When an emergency alert is raised, the Emergency Service Provider will send a medical staff team. The Community Cloud is already aware of the alert and thus authorizes the medical staff to access all building data, ensuring the team can operate with maximum effectiveness.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
This section explains two proposed systems: (1) mobile emergency system (MES) and (2) secure mobile emergency system (SMES) with privacy and authentication.
A. MOBILE EMERGENCY SYSTEM (MES)
This section explains the system requirements and the detailed scheme of the proposed system 1) SYSTEM REQUIREMENT System requirements of the proposed system are described as Definition 1.
Definition 1 (System Requirements): The proposed scheme should meet the following conditions. (1) provide real-time user location information, (2) immediately alert closest available medical workers, (3) provide medical staff with accurate real-time rescue location information, (4) provide server with continuous rescuer location updates, (5) ensure normal power consumption on user device (i.e., works in standby mode), (6) ensures user location information privacy (standby mode).
2) SCHEME OF MOBILE EMERGENCY SYSTEM
Based on Definition 1, we propose a new mobile emergency system (MES) which entails in two phases: normal-operation phase and emergency phase (Fig. 2 ).
FIGURE 2. Proposed mobile emergency system (MES).

a: NORMAL-OPERATION PHASE
During normal usage, only the server and medical staff are active in the system. Medical staff must continuously carry mobile devices which will regularly update their location information to the server. This data is stored in the Server's medical-staff-location database, which provides a real-time personnel location distribution for the entire building. The server then sends a distress call to the mobile device of the medical staff member identified as being closest to the scene, accompanied by a map of the user's current location displayed on the staff member's mobile device. This audio/vibration alert serves as a continuous reminder that the staff member has been assigned a current urgent task. (5) Active rescue: The charged medical staff member then follows the map and immediately proceeds to the scene to provide assistance.
3) COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL BETWEEN EACH ROLES
Our system entails three roles, medical staff, users and server. The communication methods are described as follows.
a: MEDICAL STAFF ONLINE
When a medical staff member is online, his/her mobile device first transmits his/her ID to the server for authentication. It then continuously updates his/her location information to the server every t sec. (e.g. 3 sec.) [26] (Fig. 3) . 
b: EMERGENCY OCCURRED
In the event of an emergency, the user's mobile device first sends an alert to the server (and continuously updates his/her alert and location information every t sec. (e.g. 3 sec.) [26] ), which then immediately sends the rescue location information to all medical staff, and specifically calls the nearest available staff member to render assistance (Fig. 4) . 
c: CANCEL THE EMERGENCY
When the user can be assisted by others at the scene and does not require additional help, s/he can cancel the alert, causing the server to transmit a cancellation message to any alerted medical staff (Fig. 5) . 
d: EMERGENCY HAS BEEN RESOLVED
When the alerted medical staff member has successfully assisted the user, s/he presses the ''Solved'' button in the APP, alerting other medical staff that the situation has been resolved. The user's mobile device will thus cease transmitting continuous location information to the server (Fig. 6 ). VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 6. The emergency has been resolved.
B. SECURE MOBILE EMERGENCY SYSTEM (SMES)
The proposed MES can provide the requirements of mobile emergency system. However, there are many security issues such as location privacy and authentication. The proposed SMES can provide security requirements.
1) NOTATIONS
Our proposed secure mobile emergency system (SMES) contains three roles (User, Medical staff, and Server) and five phases (register phase, normal-operation phase, emergency phase, cancel phase, and resolved phase). Table 1 defines the symbols and parameters used in the proposed method. 
2) ATTACKER MODEL
In our scheme, any identity communicates with each other via an insecure public channel, offering adversaries opportunities to intercept. In the following, we present the assumptions of the attacker model.
(1) An adversary may eavesdrop on all communications between protocol actors over the public channel.
(2) An attacker can modify, delete, resend and reroute the eavesdropped message. (3) An attacker cannot be a legitimate Server. (4) The attacker knows the protocol description, which means the protocol is public.
3) SECURITY REQUIREMENT
The proposed secure mobile emergency system (SMES) ensures the privacy and authentication. Security requirements are described as Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Security Requirements):
The proposed scheme should meet the following conditions.
(1) Data integrity: An attacker cannot alter the transmitted data without being detected. (2) Anonymity: Aside from the server, the user's and medical staffs' identity should not be disclosed to anyone. (3) Authentication: One of the legitimate roles (including server, users and medical staffs) should be able to proof of the identity of another. (4) Location confidentiality: An attacker cannot disclose any location information. (5) Location unforgeability: Aside from a legitimate users and medical staffs, no one should be able to successfully pose as one of these actors' location for authentication. (6) Resistance to asynchronous attacks: Attackers should not be able to block data transmissions, causing the server, medical staffs or users to be unable to synchronously update, and thus undermining the following authentication iteration. (7) Resistance to tracking attack: Attackers should not be unable to access information from the messages transmitted through the protocol to determine which users or medical staffs are involved a given communication session.
4) PROPOSED SECURE MOBILE EMERGENCY SYSTEM (SMES)
The proposed secure mobile emergency system (SMES) is based on both the system requirements in definition 1 and security requirements in definition 2. The proposed scheme entails five phases: registration phase, normal-operation phase, emergency phase, cancel phase, and resolved phase (Fig. 7) .
a: REGISTRATION PHASE
In this phase, users and medical staffs proceed registration to the Server, allowing them to share a shared key K SA and compute SID A ← h(ID A , K SA , 0), where A = U or K (Fig. 8) .
b: NORMAL-OPERATION PHASE
In this phase, medical staffs report their positions to the Server periodically, allowing the Serverto build a real-time staff-location map instantly for the follow-up rescue. The detail steps are described as follows (Fig. 9) . (1 In this phase, the server responds to an accident by sending distress calls to medical staff members in order of closest proximity to the accident site. These messages are sent until one staff member confirms the assignment. The server provides continuously updated location information for the user to ensure the staff member can easily locate the user. The process is described in detail as follows (Fig. 10) . (1) = t U + 2. If the verified result is correct, it denotes there is a medical staff that is going to help the User.
d: CANCEL PHASE
In this phase, if the user recovers on his/her own before the medical staff worker arrives, and no longer requires assistance, the user can cancel the alert, which the server will then forward to the medical staff member. This process is described in detail as follows (Fig. 11) In this phase, medical staff has arrived at the accident scene and have resolved the situation. The staff then alerts the server and the user that the situation is resolved. This process is described in detail as follows (Fig. 12) .
( 
IV. COMPARISON AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section analyses and compares the properties and securities including the six system requirements in definition 1 and the seven security requirements in definition 2. Srinivasan et al. [4] , Nie et al. [7] , Kau and Chen [8] , Moon et al. [12] , Moon et al. [13] , Giuliano et al. [19] and Ghafghazi et al. [21] .
A. COMPARISON OF PROPERTIES
Our proposed systems (MES and SMES) allow the users obtain rescue at first time, and it provides six major properties.
(1-1) Provides real-time user location information: Location sensors and continuous calculations are used to derive the user's real-time coordinates which are then provided to the server. In non-emergency situations, the system does not track user locations. All user location is protected from unintentional disclosure.
B. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY PROPERTIES FOR PROPOSED SMES
Aside from the six requirements in definition 1, SMES also provides seven security properties including data integrity, anonymity. authentication, location confidentiality, location unforgeability, resistance to asynchronous attacks, and resistance to tracking attacks.
1) DATA INTEGRITY
Because E K (loc||t M ) and t M ? = t M require verification, therefore if loc is changed, then E K (loc||t M ) will also change, thus the verification t M ? = t M will not succeed, and the proposed method achieves data integrity. Theorem 1 proves the property of data integrity from definition 3.
Definition 3 (Partial Message Forged Problem for Symmetric Cryptosystem
, where k is a symmetric encryption/decryption key, and X = X . If C can be evaluated from given Y and C, then we say the partial message forged problem for symmetric cryptosystem is solved. (The probability of solving this problem is denoted as Pr(C |Y , C) = ε 1 ).
Theorem 1 (Data Integrity): In our scheme, if C 1 can be evaluated and verified successfully from eavesdropped t 1 and C 1 , then the partial message forged problem for symmetric cryptosystem can be solved, where
Proof. In our scheme, assume an adversary tries to evaluate C 1 = E k 1 m ||t 1 from eavesdropped t 1 and C 1 = E k 1 (m||t 1 ), where C 1 can be verified successfully. Let RO 1 be a random oracle: input t 1 and C 1 to output C 1 (i.e. RO 1 (t 1 , C 1 ) → C 1 .) In definition 3, let t 1 ← Y and C 1 ← C be input parameters of RO 1 and we obtain output C 1 . Let C ← C 1 , then C is evaluated. Therefore, Pr(C 1 |t 1 , C 1 ) ≤ Pr(C |Y , C) = ε 1 , which means the partial message forged problem for symmetric cryptosystem can be solved if RO 1 exists.
2) ANONYMITY
An attacker seeking to obtain information from both sides must use SID A for calculations, but a one way hash function is irreversible, thus ID A cannot be derived from SID A ← h (ID A , K SA , t A ) , and the proposed method achieves anonymity. Theorem 2 proves the property of anonymity from definition 4. h(a, b, c) . If a can be evaluated from given c and h 1 , then we say the partial hash problem is solved. (The probability of solving this problem is denoted as Pr(a|h 1 
Theorem 2 (Anonymity): In our scheme, if attacker can evaluate ID U from SID U , then the partial hash problem can be solved.
Proof. In our scheme, assume an adversary tries to compute ID U from eavesdropped SID U and t U . Let RO 2 be a random oracle: input SID U and t U to output ID U (i.e. RO 2 (t U , SID U ) → ID U .) In definition 4, let t U ← c and SID U ← h 1 be input parameters of RO 2 and we obtain output ID U . Let a ← ID U , then a is evaluated. Therefore, Pr(ID U |SID U , t U ) ≤ Pr(a|h 1 , c) = ε 2 , which means the partial hash problem can be solved if RO 2 exists.
3) AUTHENTICATION
Because t M ? = t M requires verification, if an attacker establishes a new t M or uses eavesdrops t M , he still does not possess K to encrypt E K (loc||t M ) and thus authentication fails, and the proposed method achieves authentication. Theorem 3 proves the property of authentication from definition 5.
Definition 5 (Second Partial Message Forged Problem for Symmetric Cryptosystem
, where k is a symmetric encryption/decryption key, Y = Y , and X can be either the same as or different to X . If C can be evaluated from chosen Y and given Y and C, then we say the second partial message forged problem for symmetric cryptosystem is solved. (The probability of solving this problem is denoted as Pr(Y , C |Y , C) = ε 3 ).
Theorem 3 (Authentication): In our scheme, if an adversary can impersonate the server, a medical staff, or a user for authentication, then the second partial message forged problem for symmetric cryptosystem can be solved.
Proof. In our scheme, assume an adversary tries to impersonate the server, a medical staff, or a user for authentication. S/he has to evaluate C 1 = E k 1 m ||t 1 from chosen t 1 and eavesdropped t 1 and C 1 = E k 1 (m||t 1 ), where m solved , t S ) , etc. Let RO 3 be a random oracle such that
In definition 5, let t 1 ← Y and C 1 ← C be input parameters of RO 3 and we obtain output t 1 and C 1 . Let Y ← t 1 and C ← C 1 , then Y and C are evaluated. Therefore, Pr(t 1 , C 1 |t 1 , C 1 ) ≤ Pr(Y , C |Y , C) = ε 3 , which means the second partial message forged problem for symmetric cryptosystem can be solved if RO 3 exists.
4) LOCATION CONFIDENTIALITY
Because E K (loc||t M ) is encrypted with the key K which an attacker would need to obtain loc, thus the proposed method achieves location information privacy. Theorem 4 proves the property of location confidentiality from definition 6.
Definition 6 (Partial Decryption Problem for Symmetric Cryptosystem): Let X , Y ∈ Z and C = E k (X ||Y ), where k is a symmetric encryption/decryption key. If X can be evaluated from given Y and C, then we say the partial decryption problem for symmetric cryptosystem is solved. (The probability of solving this problem is denoted as Pr(X |Y , C) = ε 4 )
Theorem 4 (Location Confidentiality): In our scheme, if attacker can evaluate loc from eavesdropped t 1 and C 1 = E k SM (loc||t 1 ), then the partial decryption problem for symmetric cryptosystem can be solved. (Note: t 1 can stand for t U , t M or t S .)
Proof. In our scheme, assume an adversary tries to evaluate loc from eavesdropped t 1 and C 1 = E k SM (loc||t 1 ). Let RO 4 be a random oracle such that RO 4 (t 1 , C 1 ) → loc. In definition 6, Let t 1 ← Y and C 1 ← C be input parameters of RO 4 and we obtain output loc. Let X ← loc, then X can be evaluated. Therefore, Pr(loc|t 1 , C 1 ) ≤ Pr(X |Y , C) = ε 4 , which means the partial decryption problem for symmetric cryptosystem can be solved if RO 4 exists.
5) LOCATION UNFORGEABILITY
An attacker seeking to forge location information must first obtain the key K to obtain E K (loc||t M ), and thus receive server authentication through t M ? = t M . However, the attacker cannot calculate K , thus the proposed method achieves location unforgeability. Theorem 5 proves the property of location unforgeability from definition 7. Theorem 5 (Location Unforgeability): In our scheme, if C 1 can be evaluated and verified successfully from chosen forged loc and t 1 and eavesdropped t 1 and C 1 , then the forged problem for symmetric cryptosystem can be solved, where a 2 ) can be evaluated from given h 1 , h 2 , c 1 and c 2 , then we say the partial pre-hashed-message tracking problem is solved, where c 1 = c 2 and isEqual(a 1 , a 2 ) is 0 (if a 1 = a 2 ) or 1 (if a 1 = a 2 ). (The probability of solving this problem is denoted as |2 Pr (isEqual(a 1 , a 2 
Definition 7 (Forged Problem for Symmetric Cryptosystem):
Theorem 6 (Resistance to Tracking Attacks): In our scheme, if an attacker can evaluate the value of is Equal(ID
j , t 1 and t 2 , then the partial pre-hashed-message tracking problem can be solved, where SID 
← h 2 , t 1 ← c 1 and t 2 ← c 2 be input parameters of RO 6 and we obtain output isEqual(ID 1 , a 2 )|h 1 , h 2 , c 1 , c 2 ) , which means the partial pre-hashed-message tracking problem can be solved if RO 6 exists.
C. COMPARISON OF TRANSMISSION TECHNOLOGIES
In Table 3 , we compare transmission technologies including Internet, WiFi, UWB, RFID, IMU, Bluetooth, Zigbee, GPS along with entities and user information security, where internet refers to WiFi or 3G/4G network. The entities in each system are first responders and person [2] ; first responder, portable communication unit, track server, and authorized personnel [3] ; smart building (equipped with a hybrid indoor positioning and tracking, motion detection and sensing system), community cloud, emergency service provider, and emergency responder [4] ; ZigBee, underground personnel, and physiological indicators [7] ; the smart phone-based pocket fall accident detector, the coordination center, and the rescue center [8] ; portable access points (consisted of two ranging devices: anchor and tag), monitor station, and firemen [12] ; portable access points (consisted of two ranging devices: anchor and tag), monitor station, and first responders [13] ; RFID Tag, RFID Reader, User device, and Remote command and control center [19] ; key generation authority, public safety answering point, cloud server, data owners, first responders, and tamper proof GPS [21] ; and user, medical staff, and server [MES/SMES].
The indications of asterisks are shown as follows. * 2: This paper suggests two integrated positioning system architectures for first responders and person. * 3: IMU-based systems are suggested for indoor first-responder positioning, while pedometer and compass are suggested for indoor personal positioning. * 4: A step detection algorithm is used and current heading of a person is found by using the magnetometer and the gyroscope. * 5: A smart building is equipped with a hybrid system. * 6: Fall accident detector uses IMU-based sensors.
* 7: The two ranging devices (anchor and tag) in each AP follow the IEEE 802.15.4a standard, which specifies four different PHYs (three of which utilized direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), and one which used parallel-sequence spread spectrum (PSSS)) and two additional PHYs (using ultra-wideband (UWB) and chirp spread spectrum (CSS)). * 8: It is assumed that the monitoring station is the origin of the whole positioning system and given by the conventional GPS. * 9: User Device can exploit the available embedded chipset to calculate its outdoor position (through A-GPS or GPS) as well as to integrate the indoor localization procedure. * 10: It depends on the positioning method, such as Bluetoothbased beacon positioning method.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents the implementation of the proposed MES and SMES. We use one personal computer and two android phones to implement a server, a user and a medical staff respectively. In addition, we use Estimote's beacons to offer the locational information. The personal computer implementation used Windows 8.1 with an Intel (R) core (TM) i5-2400CPU @ 3.10GHz and 4G RAM. Android phone implementation used HTC Desire 816 based on Android 5.0 and Qualcomm S400 1.6GHz. Moreover, the hash function used is SHA-256 [24] , the symmetric encryption algorithm is AES [25] . Table 4 compares the performance (including computation and communication cost) between each phases of our SMES to show their efficiency, Table 5 shows the average implementation time in each phase. In our implementation, we assume that the system time of the server and two Android phones are synchronized. However, the system times on the server and the Android phones are difficult to be synchronized. Fortunately, the experience in implementation shows that the system time difference between the server and the phones is within mini seconds. By assuming the maximum system time difference between the server and phones is 1000 mini seconds, and the value t S −t M is between 10 ms and 30 ms, we suggest to set T th 1 and T th 2 to −990 ms and 1030 ms, respectively. (In real situation, the value t S − t M is suggested to be measured again for much accuracy.)
VI. CONCLUSION
Aging societies are increasing demands on understaffed nursing homes and care facilities, creating a critical need for optimal efficiency. This paper proposes a mobile emergency call and the nearest rescuer information system with privacy and authentication, which provides six system requirements and seven security requirements (including data integrity, anonymity. authentication, location confidentiality, location unforgeability, resistance to asynchronous attacks, and resistance to tracking attacks). Compared with other schemes, only our schemes provide the system property: instant notification of nearest available medical staff member. Moreover, most scheme do not supply any security characteristics while our SMES scheme provide six security properties (along with security proves via a formal security proving model), including two special security properties: anonymity and authentication, which are only offered by SMES scheme. The proposed system was implemented in Android and Windows, can complete the emergency phase and the resolve phase in only 104ms and 90ms in average, and can significantly improve patient safety in homes, hospitals and other care facilities. Future work will focus on further developing related applications to enhance hospital care environments and improve long-term care conditions.
